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In the Netherlands and other European constitutional states, the Montesquian trias politica has traditionally determined the role of the judiciary as a state power, akin to the legislative and the executive. The judiciary has to enforce the law, which implies the twofold task of keeping the legislative and executive in line with (constitutional) law and adjudicating between citizens. As such, the term constitutional, in the sense of the somewhat odd adverb Rechtsstaatlich, seems to indicate an essential category by which the role and identity of the judge is determined.
	Although the notion of constitutionality is clear on an abstract level, it has been qualified by developments that put its effectiveness as determining category severely into perspective. The ultimate principle in determining ‘state powers,’ such as the judiciary, is no longer the Rechtsstaat, but the more ‘vague’ rule of law.​[2]​ How can we outline the normative implications that the rule of law has for the judiciary? 
In this paper, this question is examined from both a conceptual and an historical point of view. Part one shows how internationalization, horizontalization and individualization affect the classic concept of the Rechtsstaat. Part two shows how the Dutch Rechtsstaat historically developed into a rule of law in which the state-centric perspective lost its pivotal role and the role of the judiciary increased. In a final part, I will reconsider the central question of this paper: which checks and balances does the rule of law offer in regard to the judiciary? I will suggest three guidelines that might direct constitutional lawmaking: finding reciprocal patterns, articulating normative rule of law principles and developing tools to select, safeguard and further the individual qualities of judges.


Part One: The classic concept of the Rechtsstaat 

1.  Defining ideas

Er gehört zu jenen vom Wortsinn her vagen und nicht ausdeutbaren Schleusenbegriffen, die sich ‘objektiv’, aus sich heraus, niemals abschließend definieren lassen, vielmehr offen sind für das Einströmen sich wandelnder staats- und verfassungstheoretischer Vorstellungen und damit auch für verschiedenartige Konkretisierungen, ohne sich dabei indessen inhaltlich völlig zu verändern.

Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde
(a) Rechtsstaat, state and legal order 

Although the idea dates back further,​[3]​ the word Rechtsstaat did not come into use until the 19th century.​[4]​ Even though it is not conceptually equivalent to state or legal order - every Rechtsstaat is both a state and a legal order, but not every state is a Rechtsstaat and not every legal order is a state - the designation Rechtsstaat according to Kelsen is rather pleonastic when state and legal order are mutually identified.​[5]​ The added value of the term lies in its more specific meaning, namely meeting the demands of democracy​[6]​ and legal certainty.  
As a legal order, a Rechtsstaat is to some extent centralized, having a central authority, which enacts and administers laws. It is therefore a coercive order, yet bound by its own laws, which contain certain fundamental freedom rights. These laws are administered by independent courts. Judges, to which citizens have access, are competent to scrutinize the exercise of authority.​[7]​ 
As a state, a Rechtsstaat is sovereign in the relationship between government and subject, in relation to other states and in relation to other entities such as churches, science or the arts. In these relations, it has legal personality. All its competences derive from legislation. The legislator, the government and the judiciary are relatively autonomous organs and together form a system of checks and balances. Concerning this ‘doctrine of identity’ of state and Rechtsstaat, Radbruch insists that it is characterized by a fundamental tension,​[8]​ because the concept of law and the concept of the state are categorically distinct. If the state is regarded as a legal concept, it is no more than a substrate for legal thinking. In this conception, the state can never be unjust, for regardless of whether it is a police state or a welfare state, it will legitimize itself by its coincidence with law. The concept of law, however, does not coincide with that of state, because the concept of law implies ideas that may conflict with the state, such as legal certainty or even justice. When these ideas are embraced by the state, the relationship between the state and law relaxes.
An important condition for the coincidence of legal order and the state lies in the level of consciousness of people. Can they leave punishment to the Rechtsstaat and not take justice into their own hands?​[9]​ Are they willing to choose a parliament, be represented by it and render it accountable? The intrinsic link between the reality of the Rechtsstaat and the level of consciousness of the individuals who fall under its authority and who determine its scope makes the concept of the Rechtsstaat difficult to define in concreto. 

(b) Rechtsstaat and civil society

Thus the concept of the Rechtsstaat is in principle ‘empty.’ It offers a regulatory norm, but has no specific content concerning what to do, to whom, when and how. When put into an historical perspective, the Rechtsstaat is the result of the Enlightenment, in which – in the wake of three centuries of religious wars – reason emerged as the central and neutral principle to ensure the freedom of religion as such. This process of secularization​[10]​ led to a distinction between the ‘neutral’ state, operating by universal categories of reason, and a multitude of groups, also indicated as (civil) society.​[11]​  
Formally, the ‘empty’ concept of the Rechtsstaat finds its complement in notions like democracy and nationality, but these notions are by no means homogeneous. Democracy is no self-sufficient principle in the way that nationality more or less is. The ideological pluralism that has become a European cultural fact since the religious wars seems to be essentially connected with the concept of democracy. A plural democracy is made possible by the normative framework of the Rechtsstaat.​[12]​ It is the formal, empty, nature of the Rechtsstaat that makes material diversity possible.

(c) Society and citizenship

The distinction between the state and civil society, which at the same time requires that the one implies the other, involves an anthropological concept in which citizenship implicates societal roles.​[13]​ 
According to the classic natural law conception, the individual as a human being takes part in the ‘societas generis humani’– subject to the laws of ethics – whereas the individual as a citizen is part of a community and subject to the laws of politics.​[14]​ The modern conception of the Rechtsstaat accounts for both. The individual as a human being, with wants and needs, is accounted for by civil society, in which he is a ‘bourgeois.’ The individual as a citizen, equal to other citizens, is a member of the state, in which he is a ‘citoyen.’ As a citoyen, he adheres to state ideals such as foundational rights or constitutional principles, which have an albeit absolute status within state boundaries. In this manner, the state has – more or less - become a concrete realm of the societas generis humani.

2.  The classic concept of the Rechtsstaat put into perspective

















A top-down approach, which takes the Rechtsstaat as a starting point in regard to civil society and citizenship, and which regards the international order as a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, is no longer adequate. In respect to internationalization, there is the growing influence of international tribunals and judges. In respect to horizontalization, Rechtsstaatlichkeit can barely function as a fundamental principle, since Rechtsstaat and civil society have permutated and society has ‘emancipated’ itself against the state. The fact that a judge represents the state and its laws is, finally, no longer any guarantee of earning the trust or respect of individuals. The international rule of law has put the individual in the spotlight, granting him fundamental rights and creating positive obligations for states to secure his individuality.


Part two: From a Rechtsstaat with a separation of powers to a rule of law with checks and balances - a concise history of The Netherlands.​[20]​ 

A conceptual analysis does not suffice to outline the checks and balances that the rule of law may imply for the judiciary. To assess the deficits of a concept and to formulate suggestions, the concrete history of that concept is needed. In this section, the development of the Rechtsstaat in the Netherlands will be discussed. I will confine myself to the following timetable. In the section concerning the 19th century, I will describe the apex of the Rechtsstaat. Then I will discuss three developments, which took place at the outset of the 20th century, namely the loss of power of the legislator, the upsurge of civil society and citizenship and the rise of administrative appeal. I then discuss three developments leading up to 1960, namely the emergence of the welfare state, a material approach to fundamental rights and European and international developments. I will conclude with a summarizing overview of current developments.  

1. The 19th century – the apex of the Rechtsstaat 

Napoleon’s centralization politics and the codification that was brought about by the nationalization of the French judicial system caused a certain enthusiasm in regard to the new legal order. This enthusiasm was in part due to the fact that the clarity of the new order was beneficial to trade, and in part because the newly formed bourgeoisie recognized its chances for political emancipation. In the 19th century, legalism was a general European phenomenon.​[21]​ Correspondingly, the disposition of 19th-century jurists can be said to have been legalistic.​[22]​ In this new legal order, the legal system became more autonomous and tended towards internal consistency. This was to make it effective with respect to societal and economic life.​[23]​ 
According to Max Weber, the systemic nature of the legal scholarship of his time was characterized by five methodic postulates which together determined whether it had achieved ‘den Höchstand methodisch-logischer Rationalität’: (1) Every concrete legal decision is an application of an abstract rule to a specific case. (2) By means of rules of logic it ought to be possible to deduce from positive abstract legal rules a decision for every specific case. (3) Positive objective law is in principle a ‘lückenloses’ system of legal propositions. (4) That which cannot be reconstructed in rational, i.e. juristic terms, is not legally relevant. (5) Societal conduct is either an ‘application’ or ‘violation’ of legal rules.
By means of these postulates, the administration of justice was to serve as a tool to look after the budding Rechtsstaat.​[24]​ To this end, the autonomy of the provincial courts was abolished (1848). In order to promote state unity, they were replaced by five courts of appeal (1877).​[25]​

2. Three developments at the outset of the 20th century

Towards the end of the 19th century, the interest in the regulating function of law in regard to economic, social and political relations increased. The transition from a legalistic view of law to a teleological one gradually progressed. I will illustrate this by describing three developments: (a) the legislator’s loss of constitutional power, (b) the upsurge of individualism and societal groups, and (c) the rise of administrative appeal.

(a)	The legislator takes a ‘step back’

Rousseau’s idea that law is an expression of the general will of the people lost ground to the idea that law is best understood as a value judgment concerning concrete interests. Besides written law, other sources of law were indicated in literature, such as conscience, ‘Rechtsgefühl,’ or legal consciousness.​[26]​ In order to keep the legislative process on a par with the consciousness of the people, legislation must take place at a more decentralized level, for example, by the use of open norms and delegation. This enhanced the administration’s competence to act according to its own insights and preferences. It also changed the function of the courts. Now that law had become a result of a valuing of interests, the court’s decision-making process would consist of weighing these interests. To this end, courts were offered room for a ‘freies Ermessen.’​[27]​ Now that both the activities and the personality of the judge had become more important, his task became increasingly ethical. In line with these thoughts, some scholars suggested that the Supreme Court of the Netherlands should be competent to apply not only written, but also unwritten law.​[28]​ In conclusion, one could say that the legislator lost ground in favour of both the executive and the judiciary.

(b)	The upsurge of civil society and citizenship

Civil society assumed sharper contours vis-à-vis the state. The ‘organic’ conception of society made its entrance,​[29]​ according to which the state is only charged with the mere guidance and protection of the general interest, so that the identities of societal groups remain unaffected. In fact, the self-regulating force of these ‘organs’ needs to be furthered. This conception changed the idea of the Rechtsstaat: the state was not placed ‘above’ law, but ‘served’ the law, which concretely determined relations in the civil society. 
Within the bounds of societal configuration, individual citizenship emerged. By allowing the courts to take unwritten legal principles into account, they are able to meet the needs and interests of individuals more adequately. Notable developments in social legislation took place that started from the principle of the intrinsic value of the individual. Another sign of the upsurge of the individual was the realization of general suffrage in 1919.​[30]​ 

(c)	The rise of administrative appeal

With respect to the emancipation of societal groups and individuals one development deserves special attention. While the administrative organization developed and permeated multiple sectors of society on the one hand, and emancipated societal groups attempted to gain access to politics on the other, the citizen was offered the possibility of administrative appeal.​[31]​ As constitutional review strengthened the position of the courts over against the legislator, so the rise of administrative appeal strengthened the position of the courts vis-à-vis the administration. 





Slowly but surely, the social Rechtsstaat developed into a welfare state, which put the Rechtsstaat under pressure on crucial points. Excessive delegation and the ‘freies Ermessen’ allowed to lower authorities gave rise to administrative legislation in concreto. This was at odds with the principle of the Rechtsstaat which prescribes that legislation is to be of a general character. General provisions became empty vessels and incidental provisions came to be decisive, putting the independence and impartiality of the administration under pressure.
	After the Second World War, the potential of the social Rechtsstaat was further exploited. Not only did the welfare state create a legal framework, but it also intervened in economic life in order to ensure an acceptable existence for everyone. People should not only have certainty in a legal, but also in an economic sense.​[32]​ This caused multiple and increasingly complex relations between the citizen and the government: the citizen was consumer, owner, supplier, employee, taxpayer, etc. As a result, there was more occasion for conflict. The legislator tried to meet this situation by assuming a more lenient approach, using open norms and relying on the self-regulating force of civil society. Then who was to resolve these conflicts?  A more frequent appeal to the judge was the result, whose assessment became increasingly important.

(b)	A material approach to fundamental rights 

The attention devoted to the interests of individual citizens manifested itself on a more fundamental level. In respect to fundamental rights, three main developments occurred which were later accommodated by the amendments in the 1983 Constitution. First, fundamental rights were additionally considered as having to serve material interests. The government not only had to protect classical fundamental rights, but also actively had to promote them. Instead of being regarded as mere ‘safeguarding norms’, fundamental rights also became known as ‘instruction norms.’ Second, a broader interpretation was given to the protection of fundamental interests of citizens. Fundamental interests were now also taken to cover the living and working environment of the citizen. Third, in addition to vertical fundamental rights, horizontal rights were recognized.​[33]​
Fundamental rights also received renewed attention due to European and international developments. The treaties mentioned below all have direct effect and sometimes take precedence over national legislation. This meant that the national courts became competent to test national legislation against them. 

(c)	European and international developments

In order to prevent any repetition of the atrocities that took place in the First and Second World Wars, a large number of multilateral treaties were concluded that have (in)direct effect on national sovereignty. In its Constitution, the Netherlands has laid down that the government shall promote the development of the international rule of law (Art. 90 Gw).​[34]​ Legislative, executive and judicial powers may be conferred on international institutions (Art. 92 Gw). The 1848 prohibition of judicial review was circumvented by Art. 94 Gw which instructs the courts to set aside laws that are incompatible with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons. Due to this provision, the Netherlands is considered semi-monist in relation to the international rule of law.
	Article 92 Gw has been used avidly. In the framework of the United Nations (founded 1945), the Council of Europe (founded 1949) and the European Coal and Steel Community (founded 1951) which later developed into the European Union, many treaties have been concluded (cf. ICCPR, ICESR, ECHR) and declarations have been made (cf. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and judicial authority has been accorded to international courts in a great many cases  (cf. ICJ, ICC, ECtHR, ECJ). 
The rise of international - especially European - treaties has strengthened the position of the judiciary. The interpretation of these treaties and the methods of interpretation are for a large part determined by courts, both of which have immediate effect on national legal systems. The judiciary may even render national regulations inoperative in case of incompatibility between national en international law. Thus, in comparison to the other powers of the trias politica the judge has definitely gained territory. The activities of the Dutch Parliament have decreased in value, compared to the aggregation of secondary Community law.​[35]​ In respect to community law-making it is also difficult to criticize the government when taking into account that the law-making process is based on the requirement of unanimity. A poor defense of national interests can always be explained as part of the larger diplomatic picture. 

4. Current developments 

(a) Symbiosis of legislation and administration

A number of developments have blurred the boundary between the legislator and the executive. Scholars tend to speak of a ‘duas politica,’ or ‘duo politicum,’​[36]​ regarding the executive and the legislative as ‘one’ power opposing the judiciary. This is partly due to the increasing intensity of European cooperation and partly due to the decreasing force of ideological polemics. Being a government has become more technical and less ideological. In addition, the co-legislative role of the Parliament has become less critical due to preliminary talks and coalition agreements. The monitoring role of the Senate has been almost completely eroded.
Many of these developments are easily explained through the increase of European and international law (top-down) on the one hand and a rapidly changing civil society (bottom-up) on the other. There is a need for flexible law, but this does not always benefit the quality of legislation.  
	These developments have given the courts a certain advantage. As Scheltema puts it: ‘When the defects of the political process become more apparent, the courts can feel more free to function as a countervailing power.’​[37]​ This is in line with the extended margins of judiciary competences. In administrative law, the courts have acquired the competence to monitor the executive (Arob 1975; Awb 1994). As mentioned above, the courts may test laws against international and European law, which gives them an edge over the executive and the legislator. These developments have been further enhanced by the normative determination in Article 6 ECHR of the relationship between the democratic executive on the one hand, and the judiciary on the other, which led to the abolishment of the possibility to appeal to the Crown in the Netherlands.​[38]​

(b) Access to the (Community) courts
 
European and international developments do not only contribute to the shaping of rights on which individuals can rely, but also to the growing importance of the administration of justice. Every national judge is also a Community judge: all national courts are competent to ask preliminary questions concerning the interpretation of treaty provisions or the validity and interpretation of acts of the Communities or the European Central Bank.​[39]​ To make use of this competence is obligatory if the decision is not open to appeal under national law, or when the question concerns the validity of European law. The European Court of Justice cannot, however, deliver final decisions in national proceedings. The independent and impartial administration of justice is thus maintained at decentralized levels. In line with the semi-monist approach (Arts. 93, 94 Gw) international law can be invoked at almost every stage of the proceedings, with the exception of certain matters of procedural law. The direct of effect of European law follows from European law itself.​[40]​ 
The rising number of cases that are brought before international courts is, however, alarming. The estimated number of complaints that are brought before the ECtHR was 38,000 in 2004 and 46,000 in 2005, and we may add to this the fact that the ECJ takes on average two years to answer preliminary questions. In respect to the ECJ, with a possible new canon of fundamental rights and with 10 new Member States, this timespan is not expected to become any shorter. The problem may be mitigated somewhat by conferring upon national Supreme Courts or Constitutional Courts the competence to filter preliminary questions or seek provisional solutions.​[41]​

(c) Increasing recourse to the courts

The developments mentioned above have not only led to an increase in the influence of the judiciary, but also to greater recourse to the courts. In addition to more obvious reasons, such as juridification and horizontalization, other causes might be indicated. There is the growing importance of human rights protection and the corresponding increase of testing against international law. Also, as part of the international legal order, the Netherlands is under a duty to implement a vast number of rules and regulations. The speed at which this is to be done and the lack of transparency caused by different procedures create a legislative and executive backlog, which in turn causes increased recourse to the courts.

5. Conclusion – the changed role of the judiciary 	

In summary, the role of the judiciary has changed in the following respects. 
	In respect to the traditional separation of powers, the judiciary has – with the competence to test against international law – an important tool of constitutional review against the legislator. With the possibility of administrative appeal, the role of the judiciary has also grown in respect to the executive. The role of the judiciary has thus grown considerably.
	In respect to a more complex society, there is more occasion for conflict and it is therefore more likely that people will seek recourse to a judge. In the same respect, the legislator is more inclined to the use of open norms and flexible law, which does not always have positive effect on the quality of law. The judge is then looked upon, to correct law or render laws inoperative when necessary. Also, since the legislator and executive are inclined to work together to adequately meet the needs of society – thus changing the critical relation between both powers – the need for a stronger controlling function of the judiciary has grown.
	In respect to international and European law, the judiciary has been given a central place in maintaining the rule of law. Every judge may test against international – especially European - law, and may as an effect render national law inoperative. Since the national legislator and executive cannot always keep up with the speed and volume of international and European regulations, and since it is the judiciary that decides on the interpretation and method of interpretation of international and EU law, we may certainly speak of a considerable shift in the balance of power from the legislative bodies to the judiciary.

So the question arises: is the nation-state with its Montesquian model still an adequate paradigm? As the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy put it recently: “The exclusive nature of the national legal order has been definitively breached and there is every reason to suppose that this development will continue in a more intensified manner.” Parallel to this development, an independent and impartial judiciary is developing, which serves legal protection without a fully-fledged constitutional national context.​[42]​ 
This loss of the state-central perspective correlates with the evolution of the Enlightenment ideal of the central position of the individual. Internationalization and individualization touch directly upon the position of the human being in the world. This is the fourth respect in which the role of the judiciary has changed. Individuals have been granted multiple canons of fundamental rights upon which they may take recourse even against states who violate these rights. The idea of the state becomes more relative when viewed from the perspective of the individual, and so does its protective function.​[43]​ It is this strong emphasis that many treaties place on the protection of the position of the individual that can for now compensate for the lack of democracy and may legitimate the strong position of the judiciary. It does by no means, however, eliminate the question to which checks and balances the new ‘rule of law’ should have in regard to a stronger judiciary.


Part Three: Towards a ‘rule of law’ with ‘checks and balances’? 

The rise of international treaties and the codification of universal human rights bring us closer to an autarchic position of law and its adjudication, and lead us away from the legislative and monitoring process exclusively within national borders. Now, from where do the judges derive their legitimacy? As Haak, a former president of the Dutch Supreme Court, states: ‘A judge acquires his legitimacy, not from being chosen in a democratic way – because he is not, but from the law, that both provides and limits it. The Rule of Law is his legitimacy, against which he is to test his judgments.’​[44]​ The question, however, is how. Sometimes, when the ‘rule of law’ is used to assess the legitimacy of a judicial decision, it is used with the same self-evidence as when ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit’ is used.​[45]​ We must thus look into the more specific question of which checks and balances the present-day rule of law offers in order to secure the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Legitimacy refers to the acceptance of the judiciary. This stretches beyond the strictly legal domain.​[46]​ Therefore, the directives that I now suggest are not solely concerned with constitutional process law itself. The central question is: which guidelines might direct constitutional process law in such a way, that it safeguards and furthers the legitimacy of the judiciary? I suggest three directives: hermeneutical, normative and concrete. 

1. Hermeneutical directive - rediscovering the principle of reciprocity  

The frequently heard cry that the Rechtsstaat is in fundamental crisis because state and society permeate each other or influence each other to a too large degree (horizontalization)​[47]​ should not give too much cause for alarm. The state in the Netherlands,​[48]​ Germany​[49]​ and England has never been separate from societal relations in an absolute sense. The Netherlands and Germany, for instance, have never known a persistently absolute monarchy. In addition, customary law has always played an important role in the organization of these societies. In these countries, the state is better understood as the result of societal relations. Thus, the idea that the separation of powers came from France and has decisively shaped the Dutch Rechtsstaat is a simplistic misconception. In light of the demise of the Rechtsstaat, it might therefore be interesting which factors did.
There is another, important, European tradition of continual reciprocity.​[50]​ In the Netherlands​[51]​ and in Germany​[52]​ the idea of reciprocity has always determined the relationship between the lord and his legal circle. In that respect, it is no surprise that the idea of the Rechtsstaat came from Germany rather than France. As was already remarked, the Dutch idea of the Rechtsstaat is much more similar to the English rule of law than to French codified law.​[53]​ 
The Montesquian role of the judiciary is incommensurate with this tradition of reciprocity.​[54]​ Although the 16th-century lords still had the competence to deliver verdicts, they gladly began to delegate this activity to courts,​[55]​ thereby decisively breaking with the Germanic and medieval traditions that the judge facilitated the customary law of his territorial jurisdiction – the apex of a reciprocal judiciary.​[56]​  These courts gradually developed into the 18th-century courts, which had legislative and administrative functions as well.​[57]​ The 19th century proved to be a turning point. The Montesquian separation of powers - accompanied by legal enthusiasm - formed the blueprint of the judicial organization as we know it today. In this conception, the judiciary is no longer the result of the principle of reciprocity, but the keeper of the Rechtsstaat.
So how may the principle of reciprocity be of assistance in respect to the question of the legitimacy of the judiciary? Its vagueness prevents it from being a normative principle, but it does provide hermeneutical guidance in the concretization of a system of checks and balances. The reciprocity that exists between the judiciary and individuals, societal groups, scholarship, other state powers, the international order, et cetera, outlines the basic blueprint for checks and balances. It stresses, most importantly, that the legitimacy of the judiciary should not only be established from the top down, but also – and necessarily so – from the bottom up. In this regard, the principle of reciprocity might, for example, be of guidance in establishing the judge’s margins of appreciation.

2. Normative directive - general principles of the rule of law 

The discussion of the legitimacy of the judiciary in a (international) rule of law rests on the broader debate concerning the legitimacy of the rule of law per se.​[58]​ Since Lon Fuller, it has become commonplace for rule-of-law theorists to formulate ‘basic’ rule-of-law principles, such as the principles of promulgation and of generality.​[59]​ The awareness of the grown influence of globalization and the international rule of law has given a boost to these contemplations.​[60]​ It would, however, go beyond the scope of this article to describe this discussion in full.
General principles of the rule of law are indispensable ingredients for any discussion of the legitimacy of the judiciary. Articulating patterns of reciprocity alone does not guarantee a normative legitimacy of the judge – given dangers of descriptivism and positivism. Since the second half of the 20th century, law is not just regarded as the expression of national identity or as the reflection of the will of the people at a certain time in history, but (and here natural law resurfaces) also as abstractions which are essential to humanity. It is the dialectic between the concreteness of a bottom-up approach in articulating the patterns of reciprocity and the philosophical approach of formulating essential principles of the rule of law that determines the legitimacy of law per se and therewith the scope and limits of the power of the judge.

3. Concrete directive - the individual judge: ethics, codes, appointment and education

Finding patterns of reciprocity and articulating principles of the rule of law is useless when the qualities of individual judges are insufficiently selected, guaranteed and developed. The distinction between the judicial office and the office holder suggests that the question of legitimacy does not only concern the formal aspects of the judicial role, but also the office holder who is to live up to his role. We now enter the field of judicial ethics, of codes of judicial conduct, of appointment procedures and of legal education. An extensive treatment of these subjects falls outside the scope of this article, but some remarks are in place.
	Concerning judicial ethics, there is an ongoing debate as to their scope. Are judicial ethics accessory to the judicial activity that is concerned mostly with subsuming cases under law, or do judicial ethics cover the whole range of judicial activity, and should the judge interiorize constitutional principles? The attention shifted from the first position to the latter. In a legalistic framework, judges tended to disregard their ethical stance in favour of strictly applying the law. This position is now – after Scholten, Dworkin and others – regarded as untenable. Even in a strict model of subsumption, the judge influences the choice of rules and the interpretation of the case. The model of subsumption is on a par with the model of the separation of powers, for the latter departs from the idea that the legislator makes law that is an expression of the general will and that subsequently the administration is to execute it and the judge is to administer it. Thus, the deficit of the model of subsumption drags the separation of powers down with it. This has caused the ethics of the individual judge to become the subject of much debate.​[61]​ 
	This is clear from the myriad codes of conduct that have been developed for judges over the last two decades. However, judges do not seem as strictly bound by codes as are accountants,​[62]​ lawyers and (in the Netherlands) civil-law notaries.​[63]​ The reason for this is that the public’s faith in the judiciary is still high, whereas for instance the reputation of accountants was damaged in the Enron and Ahold scandals and the public’s faith in lawyers has never been high. It is of course questionable whether this trust is unconditional; it might be better to take some precautions. Especially when it comes to international judges, who operate in an opaque system of checks and balances, clear guidelines might be necessary to secure continued trust on the part of the public.​[64]​
The same goes for appointment procedures. At national level, appointment procedures seem relatively transparent and strict. When it comes to appointment at international level, however, the procedures are by no means transparent.​[65]​ Appointment procedures are aimed at selecting the best candidates. But what does ‘best’ mean? Does ‘best’ include reflecting the political preferences in a society? Does it include maintaining a gender balance? Does re-appointing the ‘best’ candidate harm the independence of a court? These questions show that political and moral arguments co-shape the appointment processes. A final note on this subject is to say that given the increased power and competences of judges there should, perhaps, besides strict and transparent procedures for their appointment, also be strict and transparent procedures to depose judges.​[66]​
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